ID cards and migrant motivations

[nekomatic]

If any kind of immigration, benefits, employment checks etc. are mandated, even nowhere near the hostile environment levels, the most liberal option is for there to be an approved method of proving identity, rather than the adhoc and exclusionary system we have now.

Only if there are no illiberal consequences of introducing the approved method, compared to the system we have now.

[dyqik]

If any kind of immigration, benefits, employment checks etc. are mandated, even nowhere near the hostile environment levels, the most liberal option is for there to be an approved method of proving identity, rather than the adhoc and exclusionary system we have now.

Only if there are no illiberal consequences of introducing the approved method, compared to the system we have now.

I've yet to hear of any in this thread.

The national databases already exist, so those don't count.

[nekomatic]

National biometric databases with compulsory enrolment? I must have missed those.

[bob sterman]

Data mining the proposed National Identity Register was always part of Blair's ID system plan.

This sort of stuff...

https://www.wired.com/story/algorithms- ... -politics/

Denmark has used AI for data mining its databases on benefit claimants activities - but most people flagged for investigation turn out to be innocent.

Lots of this data already exists - what an ID card system (backed by a central register) does is enable all these diverse data sources to be linked and trawled.

[dyqik]

National biometric databases with compulsory enrolment? I must have missed those.

That exact thing doesn't exist yet, but databases covering the entire population, and databases that if you aren't on, you can find it hard to defend yourself against serious legal trouble, do exist.

So what bad things do a card and that database enable that couldn't otherwise happen, and what do they prevent (from the individual's point of view)?

[dyqik]

Data mining the proposed National Identity Register was always part of Blair's ID system plan.

This sort of stuff...

https://www.wired.com/story/algorithms- ... -politics/

Denmark has used AI for data mining its databases on benefit claimants activities - but most people flagged for investigation turn out to be innocent.

Lots of this data already exists - what an ID card system (backed by a central register) does is enable all these diverse data sources to be linked and trawled.

There's not really anything preventing existing databases from being trawled, cross linked and mined for e.g. benefits fraud now though. It may well already happen to some degree.

The main issues with doing that is the cost and the even higher rate of false positives, due to mistaken cross links between the databases. But that doesn't prevent the government acting on those false positives (see the PIP system for an example of the government defaulting to denying benefits), and sorting it out without access to a robust identity is even harder and more expensive for an individual affected.

This argument is very much one of degree and depends on which risks you are most concerned about - the Blair era plans to track lookups of ID was generating new data for the government, with obvious risks, but a minimum viable biometric identity database and card is not that plan.

I default to worrying about front line bigotry, jobsworths, and incompetence leading to Kafkaesque situations, over centrally planned evil. Mostly because centrally planned evil will find a way anyway, in the absence of a real republican constitution that limits the power of government.

[bolo]

There's not really anything preventing existing databases from being trawled, cross linked and mined for e.g. benefits fraud now though.

Other than the usual government ineptitude at big IT projects, that is.

[dyqik]

There's not really anything preventing existing databases from being trawled, cross linked and mined for e.g. benefits fraud now though.

Other than the usual government ineptitude at big IT projects, that is.

Some of that ineptitude is included in the higher false positive rates I mention. And government isn't much worse at big IT projects than business (who are usually the ones doing the government IT projects anyway) or academic institutions - although the top-level management has its own peculiarities in the govt case.

[Millennie Al]

This is not specifically against id cards per se, but against the requirement, in France, to carry id and produce it on request.

Now, this is the sort of thing that gives ID cards a bad name. Not just the obvious invitation to racist abuse documented by Bagpuss. But, what earthly benefit, what rational justification, is there for requiring people to identify themselves arbitrarily to the authorities? How does it help, what purpose does it serve? It doesn't prevent crime or help capture criminals. Why?

(Yes, I'm aware that the same applies in the UK (England?) if you are driving a motor vehicle.)

You are not required to produce ID if driving. You can be required to give your name and address on the spot, and to produce your driving licence, insurance certificate, and MOT certificate within seven days at a police station of your choice (the choice being made on the spot). The police may have real-time access to driving licence photos from the DVLA database to help them identify you, but this is something they do and not something you are required to do.

[Opti]

The UK police do have real-time access to the Motor Insurers database. If you are stopped by the police and they discover that you are driving uninsured your car will be seized immediately and you will then have to prove insurance cover before recovering the car.

[bob sterman]

There's not really anything preventing existing databases from being trawled, cross linked and mined for e.g. benefits fraud now though. It may well already happen to some degree.

Yes but currently data sources are not easy to link up because there is no single authoritative ID number. E.g. names on bank accounts, credit agreements, travel tickets, health records, education records, service contracts, rental contracts etc don't always match exactly. Some people have multiple national insurance numbers, some people use different variants of their name in different settings.

A National Identity Register would have solved a lot of this - making things much easier to link up.

[dyqik]

There's not really anything preventing existing databases from being trawled, cross linked and mined for e.g. benefits fraud now though. It may well already happen to some degree.

Yes but currently data sources are not easy to link up because there is no single authoritative ID number. E.g. names on bank accounts, credit agreements, travel tickets, health records, education records, service contracts, rental contracts etc don't always match exactly. Some people have multiple national insurance numbers, some people use different variants of their name in different settings.

A National Identity Register would have solved a lot of this - making things much easier to link up.

I regard it being easier to link things up as more likely to be a good thing, that reduces the likelihood of someone being denied benefits, or getting arrested or deported due to mistaken identity. That it may enable certain kinds of oppression I regard as a lower risk, because the current government is going right ahead with that oppression anyway.

[bob sterman]

And they are back on the agenda - but this time seems like they want to skip the "card" entirely and go straight for essentially what would be a national identity register.

[Sciolus]

And again we observe two distinctive characteristics of ID cards.

First, they are the solution to the problem-of-the-week. This week's problem is immigration, so ID cards are the solution to immigration.

Second, mission creep: as soon as we are told they are for one purpose (solving immigration), it just slips out that they will also be for a whole load of other things ("It will also offer ordinary citizens countless benefits, like being able to prove your identity to access key services swiftly - rather than hunting around for an old utility bill.")

If we were told clearly and unambiguously what ID cards are for and, most importantly, what they are not for, we might be able to make a sensible decision. As it is, we can only conclude that they will be used for whatever the hell the government of the day wants.

[bob sterman]

Second, mission creep: as soon as we are told they are for one purpose (solving immigration), it just slips out that they will also be for a whole load of other things ("It will also offer ordinary citizens countless benefits, like being able to prove your identity to access key services swiftly - rather than hunting around for an old utility bill.")

Yup - there will inevitably be mission creep - and I anticipate the enforcement of differential rights. Will explain.

First - the fundamental difference between ID "cards" and "digital ID" means the latter will inevitably create a database of personal activities. When you show someone an ID card - government has no record of this. Using your "digital ID" won't just involve showing the screen to someone - there will be some real-time connection/verification via a central system which will no doubt record meta-data (timestamps, location, networks, nature of the check etc). This is what Blair's National Identity Register would have created more explicitly - it was going to require people to log checks of a physical card on a central system. "Digital ID" will do the same thing - but with a more friendly-sounding name.

The existence of this verification system will be tempting for future governments. We've got people with court orders (a bit like ASBOs) banning them from doing certain things - e.g. going to football matches, buying alcohol, visiting certain places etc. Now you might think these are entirely appropriate punishments/restrictions. But how to enforce them effectively?? Hmmmm.....via a digital ID verification system. Now what's wrong with that? Well it now means EVERYONE would need to have a digital ID check when engaging in those activities. To check they are allowed to. And soon you end up building a national database of what people have been doing. E.g. who has been buying a lot of alcohol.

This mission creep might sound far-fetched - but this was exactly what Blair et al hoped the National Identity Register would allow them to do. Use it to enforce things like ASBOs - and to provide a dataset to trawl to find terrorists.

[bob sterman]

Error

[IvanV]

And again we observe two distinctive characteristics of ID cards.

First, they are the solution to the problem-of-the-week. This week's problem is immigration, so ID cards are the solution to immigration.

Second, mission creep: as soon as we are told they are for one purpose (solving immigration), it just slips out that they will also be for a whole load of other things ("It will also offer ordinary citizens countless benefits, like being able to prove your identity to access key services swiftly - rather than hunting around for an old utility bill.")

If we were told clearly and unambiguously what ID cards are for and, most importantly, what they are not for, we might be able to make a sensible decision. As it is, we can only conclude that they will be used for whatever the hell the government of the day wants.

I would go further than that. All of the previous attempts have failed on the promise that they will solve some British problem, which differs from the basic reason most other countries have ID cards. But in the attempt to design an ID card system to solve that stated problem, we were unable to follow the tried and tested approaches to ID cards of most other countries. So we had to invent something novel. And like many untested complex novel things, the project ends up costing a fortune and/or not working. This is another example of the traditional "not invented here" approach to things that results in Britain failing to be able to do things that numerous other countries routinely do and find no problem with.

It disappoints me that the Lib Dems oppose ID cards, because ID cards are, in essence, a liberal project. Identity discrimination is a problem in many countries of poor governance - you can't get any state benefits or services without one, but the socially excluded are impeded from getting one. In theory they can fix it, but at a price that is beyond their purse. We have a similar problem here. You are fine if you have a passport and a driving licence and utility bills, but it is the socially excluded who do not have these things. The Windrush deportations would never have happened had we had a standard identity system like other countries. This is the good and correct reason for identity cards, to enable all to be able to demonstrate their identity.

Though in fact the Lib Dems have opposed ID cards not on principle, but because they thought that institutions were not strong enough here to offer a sufficient protection against abuse and mismanagement.

Let us instead recognise ID cards for what they are - a system to enable people easily to demonstrate their identity, to ease transactions both with the state and private entities, and introduce a tried and tested system known to work elsewhere. And recognise that is good. Then we can see how that can be generalised or taken further useful advantage of.

[bob sterman]

Let us instead recognise ID cards for what they are - a system to enable people easily to demonstrate their identity, to ease transactions both with the state and private entities, and introduce a tried and tested system known to work elsewhere. And recognise that is good. Then we can see how that can be generalised or taken further useful advantage of.

You are describing ID "cards" which is not what Starmer is talking about.

In terms of recognising what a digital ID register is - it would be more accurate to say...

Let us instead recognise ID cards for what they are - a system to enable people easily to demonstrate their identity, to record and keep a log of all transactions both with the state and private entities

And if there was something I could do previously without this system - needing it now does not make that transaction easier.

[IvanV]

Let us instead recognise ID cards for what they are - a system to enable people easily to demonstrate their identity, to ease transactions both with the state and private entities, and introduce a tried and tested system known to work elsewhere. And recognise that is good. Then we can see how that can be generalised or taken further useful advantage of.

You are describing ID "cards" which is not what Starmer is talking about.

And that was my precise intention. I was describing ID cards, as known and understood and tried and tested in numerous relatively well-governed countries.

But the politicians in this country keep coming up with something different. It's not tried and tested. And that is why it keeps going wrong.

I urge them instead to do the tried and tested thing. Then at the least we have a useful start with a useful thing, as many relatively well-governed countries do.

[shpalman]

I see that 1.5 million people have gone online to digitally sign a document to protest about having to have a digital signature online.

Assuming of course that all those signatures are real. There ought to be some way to check.

[Gfamily]

I see that 1.5 million people have gone online to digitally sign a document to protest about having to have a digital signature online.

Assuming of course that all those signatures are real. There ought to be some way to check.

3 signatories from North Korea
4 from Vatican City
https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/730194.json

[IvanV]

I've just discovered that digital ID is kind of already here, and we will increasingly be made to use it to access government services.

I'm the Company Secretary of a small non-profit company, which is a cycling club. Companies House has recently told me:
(1) All company directors and company secretaries must verify their identities in time for their first annual return after some date in November.
(2) After 13 October, I will have to login to the Companies House website using a GOV.UK One login credential, which I should create before that date, and then after that date it will be connected to and replace my existing credential.

I've just been through this procedure, and indeed I had to create a GOV.UK One login credential for the first of these tasks. So I now have GOV.UK One login credential, which has scanned my passport and taken a live photo of my face to compare with the passport photo, in order to comply with the Companies House id requirements. If I hadn't had a passport or other suitable online scannable document, there is an option for turning up somewhere in person to verify your identity.

Meanwhile anyone who registers a new tax account with HMRC to give tax returns must use a GOV.UK One login for that, and some time in the near future those of us how have legacy logins will be transferred over.

Here is a list of all the services you can currently manage with a GOV.UK One login. It is mostly rather niche things, but it already includes managing your state pension. It seems the intention is that all such things will be managed through this login in future.

This is, in effect, a digital ID for government services, it isn't offering a process for third parties to verify your ID, which would make it rather more useful. And it suffers from the identity discrimination problem that people who don't have passports, driving licences, etc, would have difficulty setting it up for services that require positive identification.

But I wonder if in practice, given this existing infrastructure, it wouldn't be so difficult for government to go down the digital ID path.

Though we seem to be arriving in a condition where it close to compulsory to own a smartphone of recent operating system. Ryanair recently announced that shortly you won't be able to check in with a paper boarding card. As I discovered a couple of years ago, you can't check in with Ryanair with a smartphone either, unless your smartphone is sufficiently up-to-date to be able to run Ryanair's most recent app version. Fortunately, with the help of the Ryanair desk at the airport, my wife managed to connect to my account on her more modern phone, check me in, and send me the boarding card. And we were actually flying to different destinations, as I was going home and she was going to visit family.

[bob sterman]

After 13 October, I will have to login to the Companies House website using a GOV.UK One login credential, which I should create before that date, and then after that date it will be connected to and replace my existing credential.

I guess this is replacing Government Gateway IDs???

Not off to a great start...

Gov.uk One Login loses certification for digital identity trust framework
The government’s flagship digital identity system has lost its certification against the government’s own digital identity system trust framework
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366 ... -framework

[IvanV]

After 13 October, I will have to login to the Companies House website using a GOV.UK One login credential, which I should create before that date, and then after that date it will be connected to and replace my existing credential.

I guess this is replacing Government Gateway IDs???

Not off to a great start...

Gov.uk One Login loses certification for digital identity trust framework
The government’s flagship digital identity system has lost its certification against the government’s own digital identity system trust framework
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/366 ... -framework

Also reading this more recent editorial from the same publication.

So it appears that this is indeed the platform on which the government is intending to create digital IDs. And this is just why that plan is so dodgy.

Yet already as of 6 months ago it had 6 million people signed up. And it will doubtless have been expanding since then, with, for example, Companies House more or less forcing all company directors and secretaries to register through it.

Though the particular point you raise, iProov deliberately allowing its certification to lapse, seems to be a technicality rather than IProov necessarily no longer complying. I would guess this might be a some negotiation between IProov and the government, as probably with iProov technology being embedded at the core of the system, iProov would have the government over a barrel. The wording from the iProov spokesman sounds a bit like that.

[Grumble]

We seem to be arriving in a condition where it close to compulsory to own a smartphone of recent operating system.

A nephew of mine is a musician in the army. He was reprimanded recently for being late. Apparently event notices were sent out via WhatsApp and he doesn’t have a smartphone.